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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j).

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE 1:

Did the trial court err in granting Defendant/Appellee RB&G Engineering,

Inc.'s March 8, 2005 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment holding that Sunridge
Enterprises, LLC cannot recover damages for its inability to sell the "lost" 14 units
stemming from RB&G's failures in their 1993 and 1995 reports?
Standard of Review: De novo. By definition, "a district court does not resolve
issues of fact at summary judgment/' therefore, this Court "considers] the record
as a whole and review[s] the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo,
reciting all facts and fair inferences drawn from the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. White, 147 P.3d 439, 441 (Utah
2006).
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 383-90.

ISSUE 2:

Did the trial court err in granting Defendant/Appellees RB&G Engineering,

Inc.'s March 8, 2005 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment holding that the economic
loss mle barred Plaintiffs Sunridge Development Corporation's negligence claims?
Standard of Review: De novo. By definition, "a district court does not resolve
issues of fact at summary judgment," therefore, this Court "considers] the record
as a whole and review[s] the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo,
reciting all facts and fair inferences drawn from the record in the light most
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favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. White, 147 P.3d 439, 441 (Utah
2006).
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 385-87.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Appellants Sunridge Development Corporation ("Development Corp.")
and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC ("Enterprises") filed suit on February 5, 2003, alleging
negligence and breach of contract against Defendant/Appellee RB&G Engineering, Inc.
(R. atl.)
RB&G filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment on
March 8, 2005. (R. at 225.) The trial court heard arguments on the motion on July 29,
2005, and in its August 2,2005 ruling, it granted RB&G's motion for partial summary
judgment, holding that (1) Development Corp. and Enterprises could not maintain their
independent negligence claims, and (2) the economic loss rule, as well as lack of
contractual privity between Enterprises and RB&G, precluded Enterprises from
recovering for the inability to develop 14 units as a result of RB&G's admitted failure to
identify geologic faults in the development. (R. at 538.)
The parties subsequently stipulated to dismiss the remaining claims (r. at 736), and
Development Corp. and Enterprises filed the instant appeal which addresses solely the
trial court's August 2, 2005 ruling.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March 1969, Stephen Stewart ("Stewart") formed Plaintiff/Appellant Sunridge
Development Corporation ("Development Corp."). (R. at 368, 392.) Stewart is a
principal of Development Corp. (R. at 392.)
Several years later, in 1981, Development Corp. purchased an 87-acre parcel in
the City of Provo, 10.2 acres of which would later become the Alpine Brook development
("Property"), the property at issue in this case. (R. at 373.)
Development Corp. Commissions the First Geologic Report
In 1993, prior to developing the Property, Development Corp. contracted with
RB&G to perform, inter alia, a geologic study of the Property. (R. at 392-93.) On June
23, 1993, RB&G submitted its report (in the form of a two-page letter, excluding attached
maps) to Development Corp. ("1993 Report"), and RB&G invoiced Development Corp.
for the analysis. (R. at 370.) The 1993 Report analyzed potential faults and other
geologic features of the Property. (R. at 284.) It states, in part, that "the faults depicted
on the map [attached to the Report] do not necessarily exist" and that "[tjhere is a real
possibility that these faults represent linear features which were misidentified by
previous investigators." (R. at 285 (emphases added).)
Development Corp. Commissions Another Geologic Report
Two years later, in 1995, Development Corp. again commissioned RB&G, via oral
contract, to conduct a geotechnical investigation of the Property. (R. at 370, 393.)
Development Corp. wanted RB&G to determine whether geological hazards existed
5

throughout the Property and to provide recommendations for foundation design. (R. at
393.) On August 4, 1995, RB&G provided Development Corp. with its report ("1995
Report"). (R. at 291, 370.) The 1995 Report provided, in part, that there were only small
faults on the Property, but that such faults were expected for the area and that the faults
would not pose development problems. (R. at 10.) Based on RB&G's two evaluations
and recommendations, Development Corp. proceeded with the Property's development.
(R. at 10.)
Development Corp. Organizes Then Sells the Property to its Sister Entity,
Plaintiff/Appellant Sunridge Enterprises, LLC ("Enterprises")
In March 1996, Stephen Stewart formed Plaintiff/Appellant Sunridge Enterprises,
LLC ("Enterprises"). (R. at 368-69.) Stewart is a principal of Enterprises, just as he is a
principal of Development Corp. (R. at 392.)
In 1996, based on the 1993 and 1995 Reports, Development Corp. conveyed the
Property to Enterprises for development. (R. at 393.) At the time of the sale, based on
the 1993 and 1995 Reports, the Property would accommodate 86 units. (R. at 393.)
In conjunction with Development Corp.'s conveyance of the Property to
Enterprises, Development Corp. also assigned and transferred all of its rights and claims
regarding the various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals, etc., to
Enterprises. (R. at 393.)

6

Enterprises Continues to Develop the Property but Is Forced to Redesign the Property to
Accommodate Newly Discovered Faults that RB&G's Reports Missed
Subsequently, Enterprises continued to develop the Property, including applying
for the required permits from Provo City. (R. at 393-94.) Then, on October 27, 1998,
Richard Giraud of the Utah Geological Survey sent the City of Provo a letter discussing
concerns he had with the 1993 and 1995 Reports, including a recommendation that
"further evaluation of surface fault rupture is necessary, and that slope-stability, debrisflow, flooding, and rock-fall hazards [must] be addressed." (R. at 394, 435.) The Utah
Geological Association ("UGA") ^aumcvom^fm^d ^Miiori^1 testing, which—when
performed—uncovered faults that RB&G missed in its 1993 and 1995 Reports. (R. at
384.)
Based on the UGA's discoveries, Provo City required, among other things, that
certain fault set-backs be incorporated into the Property's design. (R. at 384.)
Additionally, Provo City officials stopped the Property's development at various times
from 1996 forward until Enterprises redesigned the Property to accommodate the faults.
(R. at 394-35.)
This redesign and the set-back reduced the number of developable units by 14,
amounting to a loss of $1,057,983.41. (R. at 395.) Had Development Corp. or
Enterprises known about the faults in 1993 or 1995, it would have designed the Property
such that the fault areas could have been open space, such as parks, roads, or storm
retention areas. (R. at 395-96.) By the time the mistake was discovered, the first phase
of the development was almost complete, and the road location could not be moved. Id.
7

Development Corp. and Enterprises Suffers Additional Losses Based on Their Reliance
on the 1993 and 1995 Reports
Development of the Property suffered due to Development Corp. and Enterprises'
reliance on the 1993 and 1995 Reports. (R. at 396.) For example, the state engineer had
to conduct additional inspections, leading to delays. (R. at 396.) The whole development
shut down during these delays. (R. at 396.)
Additionally, both Development Corp. and Enterprises suffered additional losses
because of their reliance on the 1993 and 1995 Reports. These losses are detailed below.1
ENTITY
Enterprises
Development Corp.
Development Corp.
Development Corp.,
Enterprises
Development Corp.,
Enterprises
Enterprises
Development Corp.,
Enterprises
Enterprises
Development Corp.
Enterprises

CATEGORY
Lost 14 units
Payroll
Trenching and
backfilling studies
Office and overhead

AMOUNT
$1,057,983.41
$612,186
$3150

CITATION
R. at 395
R. at 396
R. at 397

$9500

R. at 397

Utilities

$3300

R. at 397

Additional RB&G
reports/tests
Attorneys' fees

$35,589

R. at 397

$4891

R. at 398

Attorneys' fees
Property redesign
Landscaping/grading
the fault zone
TOTAL:

$285
$675
$18,000

R. at 398
R. at 398
R. at 398

$1,745,559.41

Based on these damages, Development Corp. and Enterprises brought suit on
February 5, 2003. (R. at 1.)

1

Only the first category of damages (the lost 14 units) is at issue in this appeal.
The remaining issues have been resolved.
8

j

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court incorrectly concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact
based on the following.
First, Enterprises can recover the lost revenue from the undevelopable 14 units
because Development Corp.'s assignment to Enterprises of all Development Corp.'s
rights vis-a-vis the RB&G contracts, which puts Enterprises and RB&G in privity of
contract. When an assignor assigns its interest in a contract, the assignor loses privity
with the original obligor, but the assignee gains privity with the original obligor. This
occurred in the instant case.
Second, the SME Industries case does not preclude recovery of the 14 units.
RB&G and the trial court misunderstood the facts of that case and the fact that SME, the
assignee on a contract, was limited to the assignor's damages (only $150,000) because
the assignor had already incurred a maximum of $150,000 in damages. Thus, that was all
SME could recover.
Third, alternatively, if the Court finds no privity between Enterprises and RB&G,
then Development Corp. remains in privity of contract with RB&G, and Development
Corp. can recover consequential damages pursuant to RB&G's conceded breach.
Fourth, even if the economic loss rule applies to Development Corp.'s negligence
claim against RB&G, the Court should establish that professional engineers, like RB&G,
have an independent duty to competently and thoroughly perform their duties. The Utah
Supreme Court left as an open question whether professionals like engineers are subject
9

to this independent duty, and this case presents a ripe opportunity for the Court to prevent
the erosion of tort liability by establishing an independent duty for professional engineers
when they are not in privity of contract with the injured party.
Professional engineers are in a position to foresee that negligence on their part will
result in substantial economic and non-economic damages for their clients. Additionally,
parties rely upon engineers' esoteric knowledge and expertise, and engineers know that.
Finally, there is an information asymmetry between professional engineers and their
clients such that their clients are forced to rely upon the engineers to accurately and
thoroughly complete their tasks. Courts across the country are increasingly limiting the
application of the economic loss rule since it effectively extinguishes tort claims. The
poison pill that is the economic loss rule is admittedly valuable in some contexts, but the
courts should limit its application.
Last, if the Court declines to find for Development Corp. and Enterprises on the
other issues, the Court should exercise its broad equitable power and allow Development
Corp. and Enterprises to recover damages. Otherwise, RB&G's liability disappears, and
it is liability proof in spite of its negligence and breaches. The Court should not allow
RB&G to escape liability through this legal black hole.

10

ARGUMENT
L

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may not grant summary

judgment unless the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When a court addresses a motion for summary judgment, the
court's function is not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide which side has the
stronger case. Rather, the court's "sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact
exist." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995).
On a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not required to
"prove" its case in order to defeat the motion. Rather, the nonmoving party is only
required to submit evidence "sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Kleinert v.
Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In addition, if there is
"any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the opposing party [and] the court must evaluate all the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment." Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah
1982). Finally, the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed for purposes of the
motion, and if there is a conflict in the evidence as to a material fact, the motion must be
denied. See, e.g., Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1100-01.
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Based on this standard and the evidence presented below, disputed issues of fact
necessitate this Court reversing the trial court's award of partial summary judgment to
RB&G.
IL

ENTERPRISES CAN RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THE LOST 14 UNITS
BECAUSE THE ASSIGNMENT FROM DEVELOPMENT CORP. TO
ENTERPRISES CREATED PRIVITY BETWEEN ENTERPRISES AND
RB&G.
In 1996, when Development Corp. sold the Property to Enterprises, Development

Corp. also assigned its universe of rights and claims regarding, among others, the various
engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals. (R. at 393.) So Enterprises
"stands in the shoes" of Development Corp. with respect to all rights, duties, and
obligations Development Corp. held. By virtue of this assigmnent, there is privity
between Enterprises and RB&G, and therefore, Enterprises can recover the loss for the 14
units.
A.

An Assignment Creates Privity Between the Assignee and the Remaining
Obligor on the Contract.

Under Utah law, an assigmnent operates to create privity between the assignee and
the original obligor on a contract. The Utah Supreme Court explicitly so held in Spears
v. Warr, in which the defendants, the Warrs, sold certain real property to the Crittendens
via warranty deed. 44 P.3d 742, 746 (Utah 2002) (overruled on other grounds by RHN
Corp, v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935 (Utah 2004)). The Warrs represented to the Crittendens
that the sale included irrigation rights on the property, but after the sale, they refused to
honor that representation, and unfortunately, the deed did not contain the agreement
. 12

concerning irrigation. Id. at 746-47. Subsequently, the Crittendens sold the property to
the Lewises, one of the plaintiffs. Id. at 747 n.5. In addition, the Crittendens also
quitclaimed any and all water rights which the Lewises had in the property. Id.
The plaintiffs, including the Lewises, sued the Warrs, and the trial court held for
the plaintiffs, ordering the Warrs to convey irrigation rights to all the plaintiffs. Id. at
747. The Warrs appealed several issues, the relevant issue for the instant case being
whether "the Lewises lacked privity of contract to sue the Warrs." Id. at 754.
The Warrs argued the quitclaim deed to the Lewises for the irrigation rights was
not an assignment, and therefore, the Lewises had no contractual claim against the Warrs.
Id. The Lewises countered by arguing they "are successors to the Crittenden's claims
because the Crittendens, by quitclaim deed, conveyed all of their interests in the irrigation
water to the Lewises." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue and recognized that the
quitclaim deed assigned not only all water rights in the property, but any and all
contractual claims against the Warrs. Id. The court held, therefore, that "the Lewises
[were] entitled to bring against the Warrs any contractual action the Crittenden's [sic]
could have brought, including the instant claim for the irrigation water rights." Id. at 755
(emphasis added). In other words, the assignment put the Warrs and the Lewises in
privity of contract.
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R

Applying Spears to the Instant Case, it is Clear that Enterprises Took All
the Rights and Benefits Development Corp. Held Under the Contracts with
RB&G—Including the Right to Sue for Breach of Contract—and Nothing
Less.

As applied to the instant case, Spears resolves the issue of whether Enterprises is
in privity with RB&G and whether Enterprises can recover damages for the lost revenue
from the undevelopable 14 units. Clearly, in light of Spears, Enterprises is privity with
RB&G as a result of Development Corp.'s assignment of "all of its rights and claims
regarding the various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals . .. ."
(R. at 393.) And just as in Spears, Enterprises can bring any contractual action against
RB&G that Development Corp. could have brought, Spears, AA P.3d at 755, because
Enterprises stands in the shoes of Development Corp. subsequent to the assignment.
In other words, in a legal sense, an assigmnent is of no consequence to the original
obligor on the contract; the original obligor's duties, rights, responsibilities, and liabilities
remain unchanged regardless of an assignment. Id. Were it otherwise, an assignor's
assignment would vitiate the original obligor's duties, obligations, and liabilities under a
contract, leaving the assignee without the bargained-for rights and benefits under the
original terms of the contract. Thus, under RB&G's view of this issue, with each
assigmnent, an assignee would not receive 100% of the rights and benefits under the
assigned contract because the original obligor somehow would have shed some of its
obligations and liabilities pursuant to the assignment. This understanding of contract
assigmnent would not put the assignee in the shoes of the assignor, as intended, but
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would re-draft the contract with each assignment, chipping away at the assignee's rights
each time.
Since assignment language in the quitclaim deed put the Warrs and the Lewises in
privity of contract, the Lewises could sue the Warrs for breach of contract. Similarly,
since the assigmnent from Development Corp. to Enterprises of all Development Corp.'s
"rights and claims regarding the various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning
approvals, etc." put Enterprises and RB&G in privity of contract, Enterprises can sue
RB&G for breach of contract.
Black's Law Dictionary also supports this position. Its defines "privity of
contract" as "[t]he relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue
each other but preventing a third party from doing so." Black's Law Dictionary 556 (2d
pocketed. 2001).
Therefore, since the assignment put Enterprises and RB&G in privity, any
damages that were Development Corp.'s became Enterprises'. Additionally, any
damages subsequent to the assignment remained with Enterprises. In either case,
Enterprises could sue RB&G for breach of contract provided Enterprises could satisfy the
elements for breach of contract.
C

RB&G Breached its 1993 and 1995 Contracts with Development Corp.
(and by Virtue of the Assignment, with Enterprises).

From the time of the 1996 Property sale and assignment of rights from
Development Corp. to Enterprises, Enterprises "owned" all of Development Corp.'s
rights under Development Corp.'s various contracts with RB&G. In a legal sense, the
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assigmnent made no difference from RB&G's perspective. It rights, duties, obligations,
and liabilities never changed. And once Enterprises discovered in 1998 that RB&G
breached its contract by, inter alia, failing to identify the faults on the Property, a cause
of action accrued. See, e.g., Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993) ("A
cause of action accrues when the last event necessary to complete the legal claim
occurs.").
Specifically, Enterprises discovered the breach in 1998 (after the 1996
assigmnent) when Richard Giraud of the Utah Geological Survey sent the City of Provo a
letter detailing the discrepancies between RB&G's reports and the actual faults on the
Property. (R. at 384.) The Utah Geological Association ("UGA") then recommended
additional testing, which uncovered faults that RB&G missed in its 1993 and 1995
Reports. (R. at 384.) Based on the UGA's discoveries, Provo City required, among other
things, that certain fault set-backs be incorporated into the Property's design. (R. at 384.)
Those set-backs ultimately covered or infringed on the so-called "lost" 14 units (i.e., the
number of developable units was reduced by 14). (R. at 384, 396.)
IX

RB&G's Breach Damaged Enterprises by Precluding Enterprises from
Selling the Lost 14 Units.

As a result of the lost 14 units, Enterprises lost the revenue those lots would have
generated, which amounts to $1,057,983.41. (R. at 396.) This constitutes part of
Enterprises' and Development Corp.'s damages (since Enterprises, the Property's
purchaser, was supposed to pay Development Corp. for the units once they sold). (R. at
396.)
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Indeed, RB&G admitted its breach at the summary judgment hearing. RB&G, in
arguing Enterprises could not assert a breach of contract claim against RB&G, said "the
difference here, your Honor, is the contract was fully performed and breached before the
assignment occurs." (R. at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).) A moment later, he reiterated:
"so when [the contracts were] assigned, [they 're] breached contract[s]'." (R. at 744, p.
52 (emphasis added).)
Thus, all the elements of a breach of contract claim (a contract, performance by
the party seeking recovery, breach by the other party, and damages, see, e.g., Eleopulos v.
McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 145 P.3d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)) are met in this case.
At the very minimum, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Development Corp.
and Enterprises, there exist issues of material facts that necessitate reversing the trial
court's grant of RB&G's motion for partial summary judgment.
IIL

THE SME INDUSTRIES CASE APPLIES, BUT THE TRIAL COURT AND
RB&G MISINTERPRETED AND MISTAKENLY RELIED UPON IT.
At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court and RB&G engaged in a lengthy

dialogue about privity of contract and how SME Indus., Inc. v. Hiompson, Ventulett,
Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 28 P.3d 669 (Utah 2001) applies to the instant case. (R. at
744, pp. 39-63.) This colloquy lasted for quite some time, and the trial court patiently
listened to RB&G's arguments that, based on SME, Enterprises and RB&G were not in
privity of contract (in spite of the assignment), and that as a result, Enterprises could not
sue RB&G for breach of contract and thereby recover damages for the lost 14 units. (R.
at 744, pp. 39-63.)
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After reading the hearing transcript (or, even better, listening to the recording), it
is clear that RB&G's arguments contradicted the court's intuition and understanding of
contract assignment, and the court repeatedly asked RB&G why the assignment failed to
put Enterprises and RB&G in privity. (R. at 744, pp.41-63.) RB&G incorrectly told the
court that "[tjhat's exactly what the Utah Supreme Court said in the SME case." (R. at
744, p. 41.)
SME does not stand for the proposition that Enterprises is not in privity with
RB&G, or that Enterprises cannot recover damages for breach of contract from RB&G,
regardless of when the breach occurred. Rather, SME supports Enterprises5 position that
Enterprises "stands in the shoes" of Development Corp. and can exercise Development
Corp.'s universe of rights and benefits conferred upon it by virtue of the contracts with
RB&G.
A thorough review of the SME case is necessary before understanding how it
instructs the instant case.
A.

The SME Industries Case.

In 1992, Salt Lake County ("SLCo.") entered into a contract for architectural
services with Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc. ("TVSA") to renovate
and expand the Salt Palace in Salt Lake City. SME Indus., 28 P.3d at 672. TVSA then
subcontracted with two other firms, Gillies, Stransky, Brems & Smith ("GSBS") and
Reaveley Engineers & Associates, Inc. ("Reaveley") (the three entities collectively
known as "the design team") that would provide engineering services, but those entities
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did not directly contract with SLCo. Id. Thus, there was no privity between SLCo. and
GSBS or SLCo. and Reaveley.
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TVSA

SLCo.

/

\

Reaveley

GSBS

Two years later, in 1994, independent from the SLCo-TVSA contract, SLCo.
contracted with Hughes-Hunt ("Hughes-Hunt") to act as the general contractor on the
project. Id. Hughes-Hunt then separately contracted with SME Industries, Inc. ("SME")
to furnish, fabricate, and erect the structural steel for the project. Id. Similar to GSBS
and Reaveley, SME did not directly contract with SLCo. Id. Thus, there was no privity
between SLCo. and SME.
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Shortly after beginning work on the project, SME encountered problems with the
structural portions of the plans as prepared by the design team. Id. These problems led
to SME submitting numerous change orders. Id. As a result, SME incurred additional
costs of more than $2 million, which SME submitted to Hughes-Hunt for payment. Id.
SME argued it was entitled to recover the costs because the design team was not timely in
responding to change order requests, and the design team's specifications often conflicted
with the plans for the project. Id. at 672-73. These problems delayed SME on this
project and other, unrelated projects as well. Id. at 673.
After receiving SME's invoice for $2 million, Hughes-Hunt forwarded it to
SLCo., which asked the design team to review it. Id. The design team recommended that
SLCo. reject the claim. Id. Nevertheless, SLCo. settled with Hughes-Hunt, paid HughesHunt $150,000, and assigned to Hughes-Hunt "all rights, causes of action, and claims
[SLCo.] had against the design team related to the structural steel portion of the project."
Id.
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1

Subsequently, Hughes-Hunt settled with SME, whereby Hughes-Hunt paid SME
the $150,000 it received from SLCo. and "assign[ed] SME all of its direct and assigned
rights, causes of action, and claims against the design team." Id.
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Thereafter, SME filed suit against the design team: TVS A, GSBS, and Reaveley.
Id. The suit included the assigned claims that SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt had against the
design team. Id. SME's two relevant causes of action were breach of contract and
negligence against the design team. Id.

(This space intentionally left blank.)
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SME's Breach of Contract Claim Against the Design Team.

First, SME brought a breach of contract claim against the design team for a breach
of the SLCo.-TVSA contract. Id. at 674. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that SME
was not & party to the SLCo,~TVSA contract and that SME was pursuing the claim
pursuant to the assigmnent from SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt. Id. The trial court concluded
that SME's breach of contract claim against the design team failed because an antiassignment clause in the SLCo.-TVSA contract prohibited the assigmnent by SLCo. to
Hughes-Hunt, and subsequently to SME, of a breach of contract cause of action against
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TVSA. Id. But the supreme court reversed, stating that the anti-assignment clause did
not specifically address assignment of a cause of action seeking money damages for
breach of contract after the contract had been fully performed. Id. at 616.
The court further stated in dicta that if the trial court determined the antiassignment clause did not prohibit SME from asserting a breach of contract claim against
the design team based on the assignment, then SME's damages would be limited to those
damages suffered by SLCo. Id. In other words, "SME may recover only what [SLCo.]
could recover from TVSA per the assignment." Id. The court then quoted the oftrepeated maxim from American Jurisprudence that "the assignee is subject to any
defenses that would have been good against the [assignor]; the assignee cannot recover
more than the assignor could recover; and the assignee never stands in a better position
than the assignor." Id.
G

SME's Damages Were Limited to $150,000 Because that is All SLCo. and
Hughes-Hunt Could Have Recovered from the Design Team, Since SLCo.
and Hughes-Hunt Both Settled for, and Suffered "Damages" of. $150.000.

It is this last principle from American Jurisprudence that RB&G pounced upon in
the summary judgment hearing in arguing that Enterprises could not recover from RB&G
for the lost 14 units. But at the hearing, RB&G omitted one crucial fact: SME's damages
were limited to those suffered by SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt (and the supreme court made
note of it) because SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt had already settled and, in so doing,
"suffered damages " to the tune of $150,000—no more, and no less.
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Thus, the key distinction between SME and the instant case is this: in SME, each
assignor (SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt), in effect, capped the damages SME could recover
from the design team by settling and incurring "damages" in the amount of $150,000.
Put yet another way, SME could not recover more than $150,000 from the design team
because $150,000 is the amount SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt could have recovered from the
design team—nothing more.
Therefore, Enterprises does not take issue with the general proposition that an
assignee cannot recover more than the assignor could recover. But in the instant case, by
virtue of the privity between Enterprises and RB&G, and by virtue of the fact that there is
no artificial cap on Development Corp.'s damages, Enterprises can recover for the lost 14
units. Any other conclusion would sequester RB&G's liability for its conceded breach of
the 1993 and 1995 contracts in a legal black hole, permitting no party to recover for the
damages cause by the breaches.
Moreover, Enterprises is not trying to recover more than Development Corp. could
have recovered. Enterprises is trying to recover the same damages Development Corp.
would have recovered but for the assignment to Enterprises. RB&G should not be able to
skirt liability for its breaches based on its contrived reading of the SME case and based on
the assignment to Enterprises.
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court misapplied the SME case,
thereby precluding Enterprises from recovering for RB&G's admitted breaches of the
1993 and 1995 contracts. Alternatively, at a minimum, there exist genuine issues of
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material facts whether Enterprises can recover for the lost 14 units based on RB&G's
breach. Regardless, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary
judgment.
IV,

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT FINDS NO PRIVITY
BETWEEN ENTERPRISES AND RB&G, THEN DEVELOPMENT CORP.
REMAINS IN PRIVITY WITH RB&G, AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.
CAN RECOVER ITS DAMAGES AS A CONSEQUENCE OF RB&G'S
BREACHES.
In the event the Court finds that Enterprises and RB&G are not in privity of

contract, then by logical conclusion, Development Corp. remains in privity of contract
with RB&G. And as a result, Development Corp. would be entitled to consequential
damages flowing from RB&G's breaches of the 1993 and 1995 contracts.
In any event, whether Development Corp. is in privity of contract, and thereby
entitled to consequential damages pursuant to RB&G's breaches, is a disputed genuine
issue of material fact necessitating reversing the trial court's grant of partial summary
judgment.
V.

EVEN IF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES TO DEVELOPMENT
CORP.'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM, RB&G HAS AN INDEPENDENT DUTY,
AS A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING FIRM, TO PERFORM
COMPETENTLY AND THOROUGHLY, THUS EXCEPTING
DEVELOPMENT CORP.'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS FROM THE
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE.
Even if the Court affirms the trial court's application of the economic loss rule to

Development Corp.'s negligence claim against RB&G, Development Corp. should
nonetheless be able to maintain its negligence claim against RB&G. Since RB&G is a
professional engineering firm, it has an independent duty to perform competently,
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professional, and thoroughly, knowing others will rely, to their detriment, upon its
analyses and conclusions. If those analyses and conclusions are incorrect due to the
engineer's negligence, the party relying thereon will suffer dire economic and noneconomic harm—just as Development Corp. and Enterprises did in this case.
RB&G could foresee economic harm to Development Corp. (in terms of delays,
demolition, re-construction, and re-design) if RB&G negligently performed its geologic
studies. This foreseeability is the very essence of tort liability, and it pushes RB&G's
liability into tort doctrines and outside of the economic loss rule.
A.

Development Corp. Lost its Privity of Contract with RB&G when
Development Corp. Assigned its Rights Under the 1993 and 1995 Contracts
to Enterprises in 1996.

Initially, Development Corp. contracted with RB&G for RB&G to perform
geologic analyses of the Property. (R. at 392-93.) But when Development Corp.
assigned its rights under those contracts to Enterprises in 1996, Development Corp. lost
its privity of contract with RB&G; Enterprises gained it. (R. at 393.) It cannot be
disputed that Development Corp. relinquished all its rights under the 1993 and 1995
contracts to Enterprises (r. at 393), thus endowing Enterprises with those rights.
As a result, Development Corp. was left as a third party, with no privity of
contract with RB&G. This is a crucial point because Development Corp. now moves this
Court to find an independent tort duty for professional engineers that exempts them from
the economic loss rule to the extent they are not in privity of contract with the injured
party. Thus, Development Corp. appeals the dismissal of its negligence claim against
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RB&G. Conversely, since Enterprises is in privity of contract with RB&G, Enterprises
does not appeal the dismissal of its negligence claims against RB&G, as Enterprises and
RB&G were in a position to allocate risk and damages by contract (by virtue of the
assignment).
R

The Economic Loss Rule Prevents a Recovery of Economic Damages
Based on a Theory of Unintentional Tort, but when an Independent Duty
Applies to the Tortfeasor, the Economic Loss Rule Does Not Preclude
Recovery of Economic Damages.

It is well-settled that the economic loss rule "prevents a party from claiming
economic damages in negligence absentphysical property damage or bodily injury."
West v. Inter-Financial Inc., 139 P3d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citation and
quotations omitted).
But equally prominent is the principle that where an "independent duty exists, the
economic loss rule does not bar a tort claim because the claim is based on a recognized
independent duty of case and thus does not fall within the scope of the rule." Id. at 1062
(citation and quotations omitted).
C.

It Is an Open Question Whether Other Professionals Owe Their Clients an
Independent Tort Duty.

In SME, although the Utah Supreme Court applied the economic loss rule to bar a
contractor's or subcontractor's negligence claim against a design professional, the court
left the door open to find an independent tort duty vis-a-vis other professionals: "the issue
of whether the economic loss rule bars claims against other professionals, such as lawyers
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and accountants, is not before us, and we do not decide it." SMEIndus., 28 P.3d at 682
n.9.
Indeed, the supreme court's application of the economic loss rule in SME was
logical and consistent with the rational behind the economic loss rule. See, e.g., West,
139 P.3d at 1062 (reasoning that Utah courts generally apply the economic loss rule
where parties can avoid their economic loss "with contracts and are thus free to adjust
their respective obligations to satisfy their mutual expectations... . [Rjelief for defeated
economic expectations . . . was to come from the contract itself..." (citations and
quotations omitted)). A building contractor and an architect are construction-savvy
entities, and they would scarcely (if ever) work together on a development sans contract.
Therefore, since a contractor and an architect can and do bargain for their rights and
remedies, and would scarcely perform otherwise, the supreme court appropriately applied
the economic loss rule to bar negligence claims by a contractor against a design
professional.
In the instant case, however, Development Corp. relied upon RB&G to accurately
and competently perform its analyses, the failure of which led to enormous financial loss
for Development Corp. Since Development Corp. lost its privity with RB&G pursuant to
the 1996 assignment, Development Corp. should now be able to assert its negligence
claim against RB&G based on RB&G's esoteric knowledge and experience, the
information asymmetry between Development Corp. and RB&G, and Development
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Corp.'s reliance upon RB&G for a professional, complete, accurate analysis of the
Property.
D.

This Court Can Properly Address Common Law Issues and Make Policy
Judgments "To Get the Law Right/' As Evidenced By the Utah Supreme
Court in Yazd v. Woodside Homes,

Admittedly, "courts [typically] cede authority over matters of policy to the
political branches of the government." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P. 3d 283,
287 (Utah 2006). But when policy considerations "bear on a subject lodged firmly within
the court's sphere, like the common law, it is entirely appropriate for the court to make
policy judgments necessary to get the law right." Id,
The question whether professional engineers owe an independent tort duty to their
clients is squarely within this Court's sphere, precisely as whether builder-contractors
owed an independent duty to their customers was within the supreme court's sphere in
Yazd, Thus, this Court can appropriately and timely speak to this issue.
R.

Professional Engineers have an Independent Duty Based on a "Special
Relationship" with their Clients Stemming from Information Asymmetry,
Engineers' Esoteric Knowledge and Expertise, and their Clients' Reliance
Thereon.

Legal duty is a product "of policy judgments applied to relationships." Yazd, 143
P.3d at 286; see also Webb v. University of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005) ("Duty
arises out of the relationship between the parties and imposes a legal obligation on one
party for the benefit of the other party."). Whether one party owes another party a legal
duty is a function of "[a]ge, knowledge, influence, bargaining power, sophistication, and
cognitive ability," among other factors. Yazd, 143 P.3d at 286. When there is a disparity
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in "one or more of these circumstances," the balance in the parties' relationship becomes
distorted "to the degree that one party is exposed to unreasonable risk/' justifying "the
law['s] intervene[tion] by creating a duty on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a
manner that does not reward exploitation of its advantage" Id. (emphasis added).
But simply because one party possesses "important, even vital" information does
not mean that party has a legal duty to another absent some relationship between the
parties. Id. at 287. An example of this is the "special relationship" doctrine in tort law.
Id. "A person has no legal duty to protect another person from the conduct of a stranger
unless the person upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed has a 'special relationship'
with either the stranger or the potential victim." Id.; see also Gilger v. Hernandez, 997
P.2d 305, 310 (Utah 2000) ("a person has no affirmative d u t y . . . to protect another from
harm" unless the person "upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed" has a special
relationship with either the person causing the harm or the injured person). Thus, in the
context of ordinary negligence actions, "a special relationship is what is required to give
rise to a duty to a c t . . . . " Webb, 125 P.3d at 910.
The essence of a "special relationship" is "dependence by one party upon the other
. . . . " Webb, 125 P.3d at 909. The Utah Supreme Court, quoting Black's Law
Dictionary, also noted that a "special relationship" is "[a] nonfiduciary relationship
having an element of trust, arising especially] when one person trusts another to exercise
a reasonable degree of care .. . ." Webb, 125 P.3d at 909-10 (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 1405 (7th ed. 1999) (first alteration in original)).
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Utah courts have found that typically, although not always, parties subject to a
"special relationship" do not allocate their risk with contracts. West, 139 P.3d at 1064.
In one particular case, the Utah Supreme Court found a "special relationship" between an
accountant and a third party despite the lack of contractual privity, thereby subjecting the
accountant to economic damage in spite of the economic loss rule. Milliner v. Elmer Fox
& Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). The supreme court went on to hold that a third party
could maintain a negligence action against an accountant where the third party relied on
the accountant's report and where the accountant knew that the party would rely on the
report for a particular purpose. Id. at 808. Speaking to privity between the parties, the
court clarified that "lack of privity is not a defense where an accountant... is aware of
the fact that his work will be relied on by a party or parties . . . . " Id.
Milliner is particularly instructive in the instant case because the accountant knew
the party would rely upon his report, just as in our case, RB&G knew Development Corp.
and/or Enterprises would rely upon RB&G's two reports. And privity or not (although
Development Corp. does not ask this Court to permit tort recovery when an engineer is in
privity with the injured party), the Utah Supreme Court suggests that where a
professional knows that a party—even a third party, in Milliner's case—will rely upon
the professional's report for a particular purpose, that party can assert a negligence claim
against the professional because a "special relationship" exists.
Utah courts have found a "special relationship" between other parties as well. For
example, as mentioned above, there is a "special relationship" between builder31

developers and their customers, even though those parties typically allocate their risk by
contract. Yazd, 143 P.3d at 287. Additionally, Utah courts found a "special relationship"
between surveyor and third parties, despite lack of privity of contract. Price-Orem
Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986).2
And in Hermansen v. Tasulis, the Utah Supreme Court found a special relationship
between real estate brokers and their clients. 48 P.3d 235, 241 (Utah 2002). In finding
the "special relationship" in Hermansen, the court reasoned that a real estate agent owes a
duty, independent of any express or implied contract, "to be honest, ethical, and
competent" in his or her relationship with the client. Id. Real estate professionals cannot,
the court held, breach their duty to be competent, and not be liable for their actions. Id.
Similarly, engineering professionals occupy a comparable status in their industry.
Companies and individuals wholly rely upon engineering professionals to provide
accurate, complete, competent advice and reports. To the extent engineering
professionals fail that standard, they must be held accountable for the consequences.
Make no mistake: there is a real and present danger, even present in this case, that an
engineering professional, like RB&G, could negligently performs its duty by, for
example, failing to identify faults, leading to considerable damage in the form of
substantial economic and non-economic losses. Yet the engineering professional would

2

Coincidentally, RB&G was a defendant in the Price-Orem case as well (there
styled as "Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc."), wherein RB&G also argued that based on a
lack of contractual privity, it could not be liable for its negligence. Especially in light of
that case, RB&G should be well aware of its duties and obligations to those who rely
upon its analyses and reports.
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be liability-proof; the damaged party could not recover any money damages in spite of
the engineer's negligence and breach. The instant case is evidence of this very scenario.
One unique feature of professional engineers that gives rise to an independent
duty—especially prominent in the instant case—is the foreseeability they have with
respect to damages should they negligently perform their duties. In other words,
engineers can foresee that their clients will suffer Herculean financial harm if the
engineers' tests, analyses, and reports are flawed due to negligence on the engineers' part.
As engineers are often involved at the beginning of a development, as RB&G was here,
the engineers know their clients rely upon them for professional, competent advice with
respect to development design and construction. If the engineers are negligent, they
know their clients will suffer the financial consequences.
Therefore, professional engineers owe their clients an independent duty to perform
competently, thoroughly, and professionally. Anything less and engineers can escape
liability, as RB&G has nearly done in this case.
R

The Economic Loss Rule, While Valuable, Is Limited in its Application,
Lest the Rule Swallow Tort Law Entirely.

As Justice Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently noted, the economic
loss rule is "'the ever-expanding, all-consuming alien life form portrayed in the 1958 Bmovie classic The Blob'" and is "'a swelling globule on the legal landscape . . . . ' " 1325
N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 841 (Wis. 2006) (Bradley, J.
dissenting) (quoting Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Wis. 2005)).
Although useful in limited contexts, this Court should take appropriate steps to limit its
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application so as to prevent the rule from swallowing legitimate causes of action and
recovery in tort.
The Florida Supreme Court sagely addressed the limited applicability and use of
the economic loss rule, as it is a potent doctrine that effectively bars otherwise valid
causes of action.
In Moransais v. Heathman, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that although
"the economic loss rule may have some genuine, but limited value in . .. damages law,
we never intended to bar well-established common law causes of action, such as those for
neglect in providing professional services " 744 So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999) (emphasis
added). Rather, as the court noted, the rule was originally intended to limit causes of
action in the product liability context, thus, the rule's application "should generally be
limited to those contexts or situations where the policy considerations are substantially
identical to those underlying the product liability-type analysis," id., such as the builderdeveloper exception the Utah Supreme Court adopted in Yazd.
Speaking more directly to negligence causes of action against "professionals," the
court went on to clarify that since such actions "often involve purely economic loss
without any accompanying personal injury or property damage, extending the economic
loss rule to these cases would effectively extinguish such causes of action." Id.; see also
Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate Commercial
Torts, Fla. B.J. 34, 40 (Nov. 1995) ("[I]f the doctrine were genuinely applied to bar all
tort claims for economic losses without accompanying personal injury or property
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damage, the rule would wreak havoc on the common law of torts."); Blanche M.
Manning, Legal Malpractice: Is it Tort or Contract?, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 741, 742
(1990) ("Because attorney malpractice rarely results in personal injury or property
damage, the damages plaintiffs seek most often in malpractice claims against attorneys
are for economic or pecuniary losses allegedly caused by the attorney's failure to exercise
adequate care."). Surely this cannot be what Utah courts have in mind for the economic
loss rule in Utah.
The Florida Supreme Court has the right analysis. Since professionals' negligence
often results only in economic loss without accompanying personal injury or property
damage, extending the economic loss rule to negligence actions against professional
engineers would extinguish recovery for professional engineers' negligence. This Court
should refuse to allow professional engineers that engage in negligence from answering
for their negligence.
G.

Other Jurisdictions Have Recognized the Limits of the Economic Loss Rule
By Applying the "Special Relationship" Exception to Professional
Engineers like RB&G, as Well as Other Professionals.

Nineteen other jurisdictions have persuasively exempted professionals—
commonly engineers, architects, and design professionals—from the protection of the
economic loss rule based on the professionals' foreseeability of the damages and on the
injured party's reliance on the professional's expertise and knowledge, about which the
professional is aware. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
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Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas,
and Washington.3

3

See, e.g., Owen v. Dodd, 431 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (contractor may
recover against architect); Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc.,
Inc., 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (subcontractor may recover against
engineer); Detweiler Bros., Inc. v. John Graham & Co., All F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Wash.
1976) (subcontractor may recover against architect); United States ex rel Los Angeles
Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (contractor
may recover against architect); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973)
(contractor may recover against architect or engineer); Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v.
Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984) (subcontractor may recover against
architect); Donnelly Const. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984)
(architect liable on negligence theory to contractor for increased cost of construction due
to error in plans and specifications); Carroll-Boone Water Dist. v. M &P Equip. Co., 661
S.W.2d 345 (Ark. 1983) (contractor may recover against engineer); Wolther v.
Schaarschrnidt, 738 P.2d25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (purchaser of home may recover
against engineer); Guardian Const, v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378 (Del.
Super. 1990) (lack of contractual privity between design engineer and general contractor
was not fatal to negligence and negligence misrepresentation claims against design
engineer, notwithstanding fact that contractor and subcontractor were seeking purely
economic damages); Normoyle-Berg & Assoc, Inc. v. Village of Deer Creek, 350 N.E.2d
559 (111. Ct. App. 1976) (contractor may recover against engineer); Gurtler, Hebert &
Co., Inc. v. WeylandMachine Shop, Inc., 405 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(subcontractor may assert third-party claim against architect); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks
Co., 222 N.E.2d 752 (Mass. 1967) (contractor may recover against engineer); Nat 7 Sand,
Inc. v. Nagel Constr., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. 1990) (subcontractor may maintain
action against engineers); Bacco Const. Co. v. American Colloid Co., 384 N.W.2d 427
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (contractor may recover against engineer); Magnolia Constr. Co.
v. Mississippi Gulf South Engrs, Inc., 518 S. 2d 1194 (Miss. 1988) (architect owes duty
to contractor); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C Morris Assoc, 418 A.2d 1290 (N.J.
Super. 1980), affd, 489 A.2d 1233 (NJ. Super. 1985) (contractor may recover against
design professional); Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson,
539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989) (owner may recover against consulting engineer); Shoffner
Indust, Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd Const. Co., 257 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (contractor
may recover against architect); Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. New Hanover County, 255
S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (architect, in absence of privity of contract, may be sued
by general contractor or subcontractor for economic loss foreseeably resulting from
architect's breach of duty of due care in performance of contract with owner); Forte
Bros, Inc. v. Natl Amusement, Inc., 525 A.2d 1301 (R.I. 1987) (contractor may recover
36

In fact, since the 1990s, courts are increasingly limiting the application of the
economic loss rule against professionals, frequently engineers, for professional
negligence. For example:
•

In Lyndon Prop. Ins. Co. v. Duke Levy & Assoc, LLC, 475 F 3 d 268 (5th Cir.
2007), the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law, held that an engineer could be
held liable in negligence in spite of a governing contract between the parties. The
court declined to apply the economic loss rule.

•

In Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nay lor, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. N.M.
2006), the U.S. District Court in New Mexico held that the economic loss rule
does not bar tort claims arising from an independent duty of care, specifically, a
negligence claim for professional negligence. That court relied in part upon the
Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Hermansen, that where an independent duty
exists, the economic loss rule does not fall within the scope of the rule. Id. at
1174.

•

In Maine Rubber Int 7 v. Envtl. Mgmt. Group, Inc. ,216 F.R.D. 222 (D. Me. 2003),
the U.S. District Court in Maine held that a party could maintain a negligence
claim for professional malpractice independent of a contract. The court declined
to apply the economic loss rule.

•

In Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 591 (W. Va. 2000), the Supreme Court of
West Virginia, although applying the economic loss rule, went on to state that a

against architect); Associated Architects & Eng'rs, Inc. v. Lubbock Glass & Mirror Co.,
422 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (subcontractor may recover against architect).
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tortfeasor may be held liable "where a special and narrowly defined relationship
can be established between the tortfeasor and the plaintiff who was deprived of an
economic benefit.. ." (emphasis added). Such cases would involve the
tortfeasor's foreseeability that economic losses would result from the tortfeasor's
negligence. Id.
•

InMoransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court
held that a party could maintain a negligence claim against engineers who failed to
detect and disclose certain defects in the property. The court declined to apply the
economic loss rule.

•

In Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co, v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc.,
463 S.E.2d 85 (S.C. 1995), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a
contractor could maintain suit in tort for purely economic losses because the
engineer owed the contractor a duty not to negligently design or negligently
supervise the project. The court declined to apply the economic loss rule.

•

In John Martin Co., Inc. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1991), the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a subcontractor, despite lack of privity, could
make a claim against the construction manager based upon negligence. The court
declined to apply the economic loss rule.

•

In City of Cairo v. Hightower Consulting Eng 'rs, Inc., 629 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2006), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the economic loss rule did not
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bar an injured party from recovering economic damages from an engineering firm
for negligence.
•

In Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc., No. X06CV000169755S,
2003 WL 22962147, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2003), the Superior Court of
Connecticut held that the economic loss rule did not bar a negligence claim against
an engineering firm.

•

In Nestlenook, Inc. v. Atlantic Design Eng'rs, No CA 01-0154A, 2003 WL
22670881, at *2 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 22, 2003), the Superior Court of
Massachusetts held that a negligence claim against an engineer was viable because
the engineer "knew [the injured party] would be relying on [the engineer's
knowledge and expertise in staking property]." The court declined to apply the
economic loss rule.
As the Court can see, jurisdictions around the country are increasingly limiting the

application of the economic loss rule to professionals, especially engineers, because
plaintiffs so wholly rely upon engineers' expertise and knowledge in planning and
developing property, whether a single home or an enormous planned community.
Engineers' knowledge, expertise, and information asymmetry give rise to this
independent duty. Utah should follow its sister jurisdictions and adopt this duty.
"A court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is 'an expression of the sum
total of those consideration of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is [or is
not] entitled to protection.'" Webb, 125 P.3d at 909 (quoting Univ. of Denver v.
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Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo. 1987)). If this Court concluded professional contractors
have no independent duty to their clients, the Court is saying Development Corp. is not
entitled to protection from RB&G's negligence. The Court is saying Development Corp.
cannot recover for RB&G's professional failures. The Court is shifting the liability for
RB&G's negligence—not on the tortfeasor, but on the injured party.
The Court should find professional engineers have an independent duty to their
clients to perform with the skill, precision, and knowledge their clients expect and the law
demands.
VL

ULTIMATELY, RB&G MUST BE HELD LIABLE TO SOMEONE FOR
ITS BREACHES OF THE 1993 AND 1995 CONTRACTS. THUS, IF THE
COURT FINDS NO PRIVITY, AND IT THE COURT APPLIES THE
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE WHILE REFUSING TO FIND AN
INDEPENDENT DUTY, RB&G'S LIABILITY GETS SWALLOWED BY A
LEGAL BLACK HOLE, AND RB&G NEVER ANSWERS FOR THE
DAMAGE IT CAUSED THROUGH ITS BREACHES. EQUITY
DEMANDS OTHERWISE.
Based on principles of equity, the Court should not allow RB&G to escape

liability for its negligence and admitted breaches. It must be liable for the consequences
of its actions.
Utah courts, "in light of [their] plenary powers in administering law and equity,
can make such orders as are necessary and expedient in order to do justice between the
parties as the particular circumstances warrant." Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah
1973).
In most cases before this Court, "fairness" and "equity" are loose concepts,
ambiguous because they rarely apply to dispositively affect the disposition of a case.
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Indeed, if appellants argued, and the Court decided, based on usually subjective notions
of equity and fairness, the law would lose its predictability.
But occasionally, a case comes along where the principles of equity are truly,
undeniably stacked in one party's favor. This is such a case.
If the Court (1) does not find Enterprises in privity with RB&G, and (2) applies
the economic loss rule to preclude Development Corp.'s negligence claim, and (3) fails to
adopt an independent duty for professional engineers, RB&G is liability proof. No party
can recover for RB&G's conceded breached which caused more than $1 million in
damages. Development Corp. and Enterprises must absorb that entire liability. This
contravenes all the principles of the law and equity.
The three goals of tort law are deterrence, retribution, and compensation.
Permitting RB&G to escape liability for its breaches contravenes all three goals. It does
not deter others from being negligent; it does not punish RB&G for its negligence; it does
not reimburse or compensate Development Corp. and Enterprises for their losses.
Based on the Court's inherent, broad powers of equity and fairness, the Court
should preclude RB&G from escaping liability by allowing Development Corp. to
recover under its negligence claim and by allowing Enterprises to assert its breach of
contract claim to recover for the lost 14 units.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant
of partial summary judgment in RB&G's favor and remand this case back to the trial
court.

th

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4m day of May 2007.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

StepheVQuesenber
Charles L. Perschon
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUNRIDGE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, etal...,

RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case # 030400328

p-p\Rrfi- vhjn-Thrcvv^-in- fMr1

Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant' s Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment.
The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the
following:
Ruling
Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with the Court on March 9,
2005, asserting that SDC's and SEL's negligence claims are barred as a matter of law by Utah's
economic loss rule. Defendant contends that only SDC's claim for breach of contract remains.
Plaintiffs assert that most of its damages are recoverable or that the amount of damages are at
least in dispute and that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment "shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving part}' is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The Utah Supreme Court, in National

S?K

American Life Insurance Company v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 403 P.2d 26 (Utah 1965), stated
that summary judgment rules "should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their purpose, to effect
the prompt administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials where
no triable issue of fact is disclosed." Id, at 29 (citations omitted). The purpose of summary
judgment is to "provide a means of searching out the undisputed facts" to find if the matter can

McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266,1267-68 (Utah 1976).
The Court first finds that there are no material issues of fact and that the issues before
the Court can be resolved as a matter of law.
The Court is unpersuaded that SDC and SEL can maintain their independent negligence
claims. The Court notes that "the economic loss rule holds that 'economic losses are not
recoverable in negligence absent physical damage or bodily injury.'" SME Industries, Inc. V.
Thompson, Ventuleet, Stainback and Associates, Inc., 2001 UT 54, \ 35, 28 P.3d 669. The
Court, therefore, for the reasons stated in Defendant's memoranda,findsthat SDC's and SEL's
negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule.
The next issue before the Court is whether the economic loss rule limits Plaintiffs'
damages. Defendant asserts that SME Industries is controlling and directly on point in this
matter and that SEL must stand in the shoes of SDC and can only recover damages that SDC is
entitled to. Plaintiffs asserts that SEL is in privity with Defendant and that SEL may seek its own

Page 2 of
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damages from Defendant. Seemingly, under general theories of contract law, one might suggest
that SEL may recover its damages which were incurred due to Defendant's breach of contract
with SDC. However, the Court notes SME Industries, which was determined in hindsight and is
controlling, stands for the rule that an assignee stands in the shoes of an assignor and that the
assignee never stands in a better position than the assignor. SME Industries, 28 P.3d at 676.
TT
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In this case, SDC and SEL have characterized their damages respectively. Under SME
Industries, SEL's damages are limited by that characterization. Accordingly, SEL only has a
claim for damages incurred by SDC1.
In summary, the Court grants Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.
Counsel for Defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling.

1

The Court notes that SEL's damages do not appear to be
consequential damages. The facts do not illustrate that SEL
bought the property at an increased price based on unit value. .
There was no showing that SEL suffered any loss of actual value
regarding the entire property due to the loss of the 14 units as
a result of Defendant's alleged breach. Moreover, Plaintiffs
generalized the development process and have not distinguished
when Plaintiffs were on notice of Defendant's breach. As a
consequence, many of Plaintiffs' alleged damages are not
consequential damages.
Page 3 of
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Dated this ;/£>£ day of August, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

>'jfifa or- ,***£^

£<

JDGE FRED D.flOWARDPU,
D. HOWARTi'i~i. f«<£tff§&&
JUDGE
* * * „ . i?d
, I I
7
District Court Juflge
^ '>\ *^€§^W$-£~/$

Page 4 of

5

'<tij

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the
August, 2005 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
Stephen Queesenberry
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3319 North University Ave
Provo, UT 84604
Attorneys for Defendant:
Craig C. Coburn
Lincoln Harris
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
PO Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
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Not Reported in A.2d, 2003 WL 22962147 (Conn.Super.), 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 99
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

Superior Court of Connecticut,
Judicial District of Waterbury.
BEST FRIENDS PET CARE, INC.

v.
DESIGN LEARNED, INC. et al.
No. X06CV000169755S.
Dec. 3, 2003.
Blackburn Stuart G Law Offices, Windsor Locks, for Best Friends Pet Care Inc.
Updike Kelly & Spellacy, Hartford, for Design Learned Inc.
Leboeuf Lamb Greene & Macrae, Hartford, for American Standard Companies Inc.
JON M. ALANDER, Judge.
* 1 In this action, the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the loss of use of its building damaged by
fire as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendant Design Learned, Inc. ("Design Learned"), an
engineering firm. The plaintiff claims that, during construction of the building, Design Learned
negligently failed to specify non-combustible flooring or a heat shield near burner units, resulting in a
fire. While the plaintiff had a contract with the construction manager of the project, it lacked a
contract with Design Learned. Design Learned has filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting
that the plaintiffs claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine.
The appellate courts of this state have not recognized the economic loss rule advocated by Design
Learned, that, in the absence of privity of contract or in the absence of injury to person or property,
the plaintiff may not recover in tort for economic losses. The decision in Flagg[EnergyiD^eveloBment
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 244 Conn. 126, 155 (1998), is inapposite as it addresses the remedies
available under the Uniform Commercial Code for injuries resulting from the sale of an allegedly
defective product.
In the context of this case, given the allegations of the complaint, the applicable law remains that a
tortfeasor is liable for negligently causing harm that was foreseeable. CoburRv,
Lenoxjjto^^
186 Conn. 370 (1982). Design Learned's knowledge that the plaintiff would rely on its work eliminates
any concern that the lack of an economic loss rule of the sort propounded by the defendant may
resuIt i n unIimited IiabiIity. See CrajgjL E y e ^
.
In short, I find persuasive the well reasoned opinions in RCD-Hudson v. T.A.T. Mason Enterprises,
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-00-598478-S, (Jan. 17, 2001) (Beach, J.)
(29 Conn. L. Rptr. 261), and Insurance Company of North America v. Town of Manchester, 17
F.Supp.2d 81 (D.Conn. 1998), rejecting the application of a blanket prohibition on the recovery of
economic losses resulting from negligent conduct in the absence of privity of contract. Accordingly,
Design Learned's motion for summary judgment is hereby denied.
Conn.Super.,2003.
Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc.
Not Reported in A.2d, 2003 WL 22962147 (Conn.Super.), 36 Conn. L Rptr. 99
END OF DOCUMENT
(C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Not Reported in N.E.2d, 17 Mass.LRptr. 25, 2003 WL 22670881 (Mass.Super.)
Superior Court of Massachusetts.
NESTLENOOK, INC.,

v.
ATLANTIC DESIGN ENGINEERS.
No. CA 01-0154A.

Oct. 22, 2003.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CHARLES]. HELY, Justice.
A.

Introduction

* 1 The defendant Atlantic Design Engineers supplied engineering services to the Town of
Middleborough and served part-time as the town engineer. Atlantic was assigned by the
Middlebourough Planning Board to review the plaintiff Nestlenook's application to for approval of a
subdivision proposed by Nestlenook. Nestlenook claims that Atlantic performed the engineering
services negligently. Specifically, Nestlenook claims that Atlantic's comment letter to the town
negligently required Nestlenook to design and construct a retention pond as part of the drainage
system for the subdivision. Nestlenook contends that its construction of the retention pond in
compliance with Atlantic's comment letter caused it economic losses and property damage.
Nestlenook alleges claims for negligence, breach of contract, breach of implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and violation of G.L. c. 93A. Only the negligence
claim can survive summary judgment.

B. Public Employee

Immunity

Atlantic is not entitled to summary judgment under the public employee immunity in G.L. c. 258, § 2.
The "public employee" definition in G.L. c. 258, § 1, includes part-time as well as full-time officers and
employees. Atlantic's part-time status with the town does not preclude public employee immunity.
The "public employee" definition in Section 1, must also be read in conjunction with the "public
employer" definition in the same section. To be a public employee the person must be an officer or
employee "of any public employer." The "public employer" definition includes towns and other
government entities if the employer "exercises direction and control" over the public employee.
Consistently with these interlocking definitions, the case law has relied on the principal's right to
exercise direction and control as a primary consideration in determining whether a particular
defendant is a public employee for Chapter 258 immunity purposes. Kelley v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659,
661-64 (1985); Smith v. Steinberg, 395 Mass. 666, 669 (1985);
Although Atlantic may have held the title of town engineer as a single, full-time employee might in
other towns, the evidence is that Atlantic was an independent contractor. The evidence supports
Nestlenook's argument that Atlantic was not subject to the right of direction and control by the town
in how it performed its engineering services. Atlantic no doubt was subject to some control by the
town in that the town assigned it projects and identified the scope of each particular assignment. The
manner of carrying out these assignments was still a matter of Atlantic's independent professional
engineering judgment. The town was not Atlantic's only engineering client, and this is also a relevant
factor. Atlantic is a private corporation, and it acts through a group of human agents rather than one
person. These factors also lessen the town's right to exercise direction and control over how Atlantic
performed its professional services.
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* 2 Suffice it to say that Atlantic has not demonstrated that it was not an independent contractor, and
it has not shown that the town retained the right to control the manner of Atlantic's performance of
its professional services. See Kelley v Rossi, supra; Smith v. Steinberg, supra; Williams v. Hartman,
413 Mass. 398 f 400-01 (1997); Hopper v. Callahan, 408 Mass. 6 2 1 , 634 (1990); Thornton v.
CommQnw^
28 Mass.,^
514 (1990); compare McNamara y. Honeyman^
43,
48 (1989); Williams v. Bresnahan. 27 Mass.App.Ct. 191 (1989); Florio v. Kennedy, 18 Mass.App.Ct.
917 (1984).

C. Economic Loss Rule
Atlantic is not entitled to summary judgment under the economic loss rule. Nestlenook has presented
evidence that it sustained physical damage to its property, rather than just economic loss, allegedly
caused by negligence of Atlantic. Priority Finishing Corp, v. LAL Construction Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct.
719, 721 (1996).

D. Negligence and Duty
Atlantic argues that it performed engineering services only to the town Planning Board and that it
cannot be liable in negligence to Nestlenook because it owed no legal duty to Nestlenook. Atlantic
relies on the lender's attorney malpractice case of Page v. Frazier, 388 Mass. 55 (1982).
As Nestlenook correctly points out, however, the negligence claim against Atlantic in this case is much
more analogous to the negligence claim against the engineer in Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 351
Mass. 497, 500-01 (1967). In Craig, the court reversed the directed verdict for the defendant
engineer on a negligence claim despite the lack of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff
contractor and the engineer. The defendant engineer in Craig knew the identity of the plaintiff
contractor and knew that the contractor would be relying on the locations of the stakes that the
defendant engineer put in for the landowner. Id. Under the authority of Craig, summary judgment
must be denied on the negligence claim.

E. Contract
There is an absence of evidence from which a fair-minded jury could conclude that Nestlenook had a
contract with Atlantic. Atlantic was selected by the town to perform engineering services for the town.
It is true that Nestlenook reimbursed the town for Atlantic's engineering services. If Nestlenook
wanted to proceed with the subdivision application, it had no choice. Nestlenook was required to pay
this reimbursement to the town by the Planning Board's procedures.
Nestlenook did not pay Atlantic for services provided to Nestlenook. Nestlenook instead was required
to pay to the town the town's costs for having Atlantic perform engineering services for the town. The
services Atlantic provided for the town were to determine for the town whether Nestlenook's plans
satisfied the town's subdivision regulations and to make comments on what type of modifications
would be required for compliance. Atlantic was hired to protect the town, not Nestlenook. Atlantic's
only contract in this case was with the town. Atlantic is entitled to summary judgment on the contract
claim.

F. Implied Warranties of Merchantability

and Fitness for a Particular Purpose

* 3 If the defendant had been a supplier of a product or other "goods" to the plaintiff, there would be
an implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, provided that the plaintiff
was a person whom the defendant might reasonably have expected to use the goods. G.L. c. 106, 55
2-314, 2-315, 2-318. Lack of privity between the user of the goods and the supplier would not be a
defense to a breach of warranty claim in such circumstances. G.L. c. 106, § 2-318.
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In this case Atlantic supplied no "goods" to Nestlenook. G.L c. 106, 5 2-105 (definition of "goods");
Garaay, Kusan, Inc, 39 MasSvApp,Ct 322,32111995}
("Even assuming in the plaintiff's favor that
the [floor hockey] game-the concept and instructions-was the "product" which was sold ..., there is
no legal support for imposing liability on such a "product" where the seller does not provide a tangible
item as well as instructions"). Because there was no contract with Nestlenook and no supplying of
goods by Atlantic to Nestlenook, there was no implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose. Atlantic is entitled to summary judgment on these implied warranty claims.

G. Chapter 93A and Trade or Commerce
On the Chapter 93A claim, Atlantic is entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. The summary
judgment evidence demonstrates that Atlantic's connection with Nestlenook in this case was strictly in
the context of Atlantic providing engineering services to the town. Nestlenook alleges that it relied on
Atlantic's recommended changes to the drainage plans, but that reliance was only in the context of
Nestlenook's application to the town Planning Board for subdivision approval. Atlantic's dealings with
Nestlenook were solely as an agent for the town Planning Board in the course of the Planning Board
performing its statutory duties under the Subdivision Control Law, G,L c^l / ._J_MK-^lGG..
Atlantic's performance of engineering services for the town Planning Board involved no business
context relationship between Atlantic and Nestlenook. Under the Chapter 93A case law involving
governmental defendants, Atlantic was therefore not engaged in trade or commerce with Nestlenook
when it reviewed Nestlenook's plans for the Planning Board in fulfilment of the Planning Board's
statutory duties. Boston Housing Authority v. Howard, All Mass. 537 (1998.).;
Ls^y^teJIace
Associates v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 427 Mass. 509, 534 (1998); Pea body N.E., Inc. v.
Marshfield, 426 Mass. 436, 439-40 (1998); Poznik v. Medical Professional Insurance Association, 417
Mass...48^ 52...(JL994); M . S e a ^
Z,.....C.Offl
416 Mass. 269^ 271 (1993); Morton v. Hanover, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 197, 206 (1997); Bretton v. State
Lottery Commission, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 736 (1996).
The second reason why Atlantic has no Chapter 93A liability is that there is an absence of evidence in
the summary judgment materials that Atlantic engaged in any unfair or deceptive conduct, even
assuming that there was negligence by Atlantic in reviewing and commenting on Nestlenook's plans.

H. Order
* 4 Summary judgment will enter for the defendant dismissing all claims in the plaintiffs complaint
except Count I alleging negligence.
Mass.Super.,2003.
Nestlenook, Inc. v. Atlantic Design Engineers
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 17 Mass.LRptr. 25, 2003 WL 22670881 (Mass.Super.)
END OF DOCUMENT
(C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Motions, Pleadings and Filings
United States District Court,
D. Maine.
MAINE RUBBER INTERNATIONAL, Plaintiff
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., Defendant
No. 02-226-P-H.
July 1, 2003.
In action for breach of contract, negligence and negligent misrepresentation, plaintiff moved for leave
to amend complaint to add negligence claim against two individual defendants, who were employees
of corporate defendant. The District Court, David M. Cohen, United States Magistrate Judge, held that
plaintiff was entitled to leave to amend complaint to add claim against two individual defendants.
Motion granted.
West Headnotes

[1] KeyCite Notes
0 3 7 9 Torts
Q-379I In General
o^379k!16 Injury or Damage from Act
^^17.9^11.8 k. Economic Loss Doctrine. MosLQltedLCases
(Formerly 379k5)
Under Maine law, the economic loss rule prohibits the recovery of damages for purely economic losses
in tort actions.

[2] KeyCite Notes...
C--1ZQA Federal Civil Procedure
<^1ZPAVII Pleadings and Motions
<^iZPAyn(E) Amendments
<sffl70Ak851 k. Form and Sufficiency of Amendment. Most Cited Cases
A motion for leave to amend a complaint may be denied if the proposed amendment would be futile.
Fed, Rules. Civ, PrpcJRule.lSCaX.ZMJ^.^A.
IK,
[31 KeyCite Notes
4>170A Federal Civil Procedure
<^170AVII Pleadings and Motions
>*>170AVII(E) Amendments
.- 170Ak851 k. Form and Sufficiency of Amendment. Most Cited Cases
"Futility" of an amendment, as would warrant denial of motion for leave to amend complaint, means
that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 12(bK6), 15(a). 28 U.S.C.A.
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f41 KevCite Notes

^

C^IZQA Federal Civil Procedure
O170AVH Pleadings and Motions
€^170AVII(E) Amendments
<^170Ak851 k. Form and Sufficiency of Amendment. Most Cited Cases
In reviewing for futility of a proposed amendment, as would warrant denial of motion for leave to
amend complaint, the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies to a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rules 12(b)(6), 15(a), 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

|i
[5] KeyCite Notes
o*2Z2 Negligence
0 2 7 2 X I V Necessity and Existence of Injury
o-272k463 k. Economic Loss Doctrine. Most Cited Cases
$
i^379 Torts KeyCite Notes
<^379I In General
c ^ 3 7 9 k l l 6 Injury or Damage from Act
ow379kll8 k. Economic Loss Doctrine. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 379k5)
Under Illinois law, the economic loss doctrine, prohibiting recovery of damages for purely economic
losses in tort actions, applies to the service industry only when the duty of the party performing the
service is defined by the contract; if the duty at issue arises outside the contract, a tort claim may
proceed.

[6] KeyCite Notes

^

-JQ170A Federal Civil Procedure
<^170AH Parties
<^170AII(J) Defects, Objections and Amendments
<^iZaAk392 k. Amendments. MosLCitM..Cases
In action against corporate defendant for breach of contract, negligence and negligent
misrepresentation, pursuant to Maine law, plaintiff was entitled to leave to amend complaint to add
negligence claim against two individual defendants, who were professional employees of corporate
defendant, even though corporate defendant moved for summary judgment on negligence claims
under economic loss doctrine, where claim for professional malpractice against individual employees
could exist independent of the parties' contract, under Maine law. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 12(b)(6),
15(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
*223 Kurt E. Olafsen, Portland, ME, for Maine Rubber International.
Daniel Rapaport, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios & Haley, LLC, Portland, ME, for Environmental
Management Group Inc.
MEMORANDUM DECISION

ON MOTION FOR LEA VE TO AMEND

DAVID M. COHEN, United States Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, Maine Rubber International, moves for leave to amend the complaint to add two
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individual defendants and to change the wording of paragraph 6 of the original complaint. Plaintiffs
Motions to Amend Complaint and to Join Parties, etc. ("Motion") (Docket No. 10) at 1-2 & n. 1. I
grant the motion.
The plaintiff seeks to add David Maglietta and Felicia Pfeffer, identified as employees of the corporate
defendant "at all relevant times," id. at 1, as individual defendants with respect to Counts I and I I I of
the complaint, which allege negligence and negligent misrepresentation. It represents that these
counts against the corporate defendant "were based upon the vicarious liability of [the defendant] for
the actions of" these individual employees, id. at 2, and contends that the motion is filed two weeks
after the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment "that made clear the need to clarify
the pleadings and to join" the individual defendants, id. at 3.

B
[11.
The defendant objects to the motion, arguing, inter alia, that the request to add the
individual defendants is merely an attempt to avoid the effect of the economic loss rule, which is the
basis for its motion for partial summary judgment, in which it seeks judgment on the negligence
counts. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, etc. ("Objection") (Docket No.
13) at 3-4. Under Maine law, the economic loss rule
marks the fundamental boundary between the law of contracts, which is designed to enforce
expectations created by agreement, and the law of torts, which is designed to protect citizens and
their property by imposing a duty of reasonable care on others. In order to preserve the bright line
between contract and tort law, the rule prohibits the recovery of purely economic losses in tort
actions. Economic loss has been defined as "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and
replacement of defective product, or consequent loss of profits—without claim of personal injury or
damage to other property."
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Childs, 52 F.5upp.2d 139, 142 (D.Me.1999) (citations and some internal
quotation marks omitted). *224 The question whether the doctrine applies to bar tort claims that
services provided pursuant to a contract were performed negligently is unresolved in Maine law. Id. at
145-46.

G3

@ S3

[2]
* [3]
" [4]
* A motion for leave to amend a complaint may be denied, notwithstanding the
admonition of Fed.^RXiyi.P,_..15(.a) that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires,"
if the proposed amendment would be futile. Grant v. News Group Boston, Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st

Cir.1995),
"Futility" means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. In reviewing for "futility," the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as
applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Glassmanjr. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted).
The scheduling order in this case provided that the deadline for joinder of parties and amendment of
the pleadings was April 16, 2003, Scheduling Order with Incorporated Rule 26(f) Order (Docket No. 4)
at 1, five weeks before the instant motion was filed on May 22, 2003. The plaintiffs failure to comply
with the deadline, while cause for concern, is not grounds for denying the motion on its face. In this
case, it is clear that the plaintiff knew the identities of the proposed individual defendants and their
respective roles in the matter at issue from the outset; the plaintiff only became interested in these
individuals as possible defendants after the defendant filed its motion for partial summary judgment
invoking the economic loss doctrine, raising the possibility that the named defendant might not be
liable on the plaintiffs tort claims. The plaintiff filed its motion two weeks after this possibility became
apparent, an acceptable delay under the circumstances. See generally MendaJeMu^
Co, v,
Rutherford, 178 F.R.D. 1. 2-3 (P.Me.1998V
The proposed amended complaint merely alleges that the proposed individual defendants are
professionals; it does not specify their expertise or indicate whether or not they are licensed. Courts
in other jurisdictions have varied in their treatment of the issue presented here. In Hydro Investors,
Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 17 (2d Cir.2000) (applying New York law), the court refused
to bar a professional malpractice claim against a defendant engineer who was employed by a
corporate defendant when the individual defendant invoked the economic loss rule. It held that the
harm arising from the professional malpractice was distinct from that governed by the contract. Id. In
Springfield H^
172.Vt....3n
the court held that the
defendants, former employees of a corporation with which the plaintiff had contracted, could not be
held liable on a claim that they negligently administered the agreement. The court, reviewing a grant

.i-._.
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of summary judgment, construed the economic loss rule to bar recovery from individual defendants
on tort claims in the absence of a special relationship between the alleged tortfeasors and the plaintiff
and found that no such relationship existed because, "[although appellees' work may have involved
complex and specialized tasks, it is undisputed that appellees did not hold themselves out as
providers of any licensed professional service." Id.. 779 A.2d at 72.

m
[5]
In Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So.2d 973 (Fla.1999), the court held that "the mere
existence of... a contract [for professional services] should not serve per se to bar an action for
professional malpractice" and allowed a negligence claim to proceed against an engineer who was
employed by a corporation that had contracted to inspect a house the purchase of which was under
consideration by the plaintiff. Id. at 974-75, 983. In Tommy L Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 320 S.C. 49, 463 S.E.2d 85, 88-89 (1995), the court relied on an
exception to the economic loss rule applicable where there is a special relationship between the
alleged tortfeasor and the injured party to allow a claim against an engineer who supervised the
construction that was the subject of the contract to proceed. The Illinois courts hold that the
economic loss doctrine applies to the service industry only when the duty of the party performing the
service is defined by the contract; if the duty at issue arises outside the contract, a tort claim may
proceed. *225 Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 159 III.2d
137, 201 III.Dec. 7 1 , 636 N.E.2d 503, 514-15 (1994) (allowing tort claim against accountants,
suggesting that claim would not lie against architect).
In Businessmen's Assurance _Co._ of Am. y.^Graham, 891 S_.„W.2d 438, 453 (Mo.App.1994), the court
held that an action in tort may proceed "if the party sues for breach of a duty recognized by the law
as arising from the relationship or status the parties have created by their agreement." It recognized
a "common law duty to provide architectural services in a professional manner." Id. at 454. In
contrast, in Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Ohio St.3d 1, 560
N.E.2d 206, 208, 212 (1990), a general contractor sued an architect, and the court held that, "in the
absence of privity of contract no cause of action exists in tort to recover economic damages against
design professionals."
While the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has not addressed this issue, a justice of the Superior
Court has considered it in some detail. In Pendleton Yacht Yard, Inc. v. Smith, 2003 Me.Super. LEXIS
49 (Maine Superior Court, Waldo County, Docket No. CV-01-047) (Mar. 20, 2003), Justice Marden
denied a motion for summary judgment on a negligence claim against a marine surveyor on the
ground that recovery should be limited to a contract claim against his employer, the corporate
defendant. Id. at * l - * 2 . Citing a decision of the bankruptcy court for the District of Maine and an
unreported decision of this court, id. at * 9 - * 1 0 , Justice Marden held that summary judgment was
inappropriate because there was a genuine issue as to whether any contract existed between the
plaintiff and the individual defendant and because the individual defendant may have made negligent
misrepresentations outside the scope of the contract between the plaintiff and the corporate
defendant, id. at *12-*13.

B
[6]
Here, the proposed amended complaint alleges only that Maglietta and Pfeffer were
professionals and, as such, owed a duty to the plaintiff. While it may well become evident at some
later point that any such duties were within the scope of the contract, that neither Maglietta nor
Pfeffer was licensed by the State of Maine or that for some other reason neither individual may
reasonably be held to have a duty extending to the plaintiff that could have been breached under the
circumstances of this case, at the present time the only issue before the court is whether it appears
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be able to recover under any set of facts compatible with the
terms of the proposed amended complaint, read with every reasonable inference in the plaintiff's
favor. On that issue, the plaintiff prevails, because I conclude that it is likely that the Maine Law Court
would find that a claim for professional malpractice may exist independent of a contract under certain
circumstances, as did all but one of the courts discussed above. At this time, it is not necessary to
determine what those circumstances might be and whether they are present in this case.
The defendant does not address the plaintiff's requested amendment to the language of paragraph 6
of the original complaint. No reason to deny the request is apparent; it is granted.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motion to leave to amend its complaint is GRANTED.
D.Me.,2003.
Maine Rubber Intern, v. Environmental Management Group, Inc.
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